18 Jun 2010

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Propaganda meeting for prevention |
18-JUN-2010 | |
Subject | PRO/AH/EDR> |
AVIAN INFLUENZA (38): WORLD UPDATE, FAOIn this update:
[1,2] FAO reports
******
[1] FAO report
Date: Tue 15 Jun 2010
From: Akiko Kamata <Akiko.Kamata@fao.org> [edited]
FAO Animal Influenza Disease Emergency News [FAOAIDEnews], situation update 67
------------------------------------------------------------------------------At a glance: the latest HPAI outbreaks for the period 1 May-15 Jun 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
------
Egypt
-----A total of 24 H5 HPAI positive cases were reported in 12 governorates
during 1-31 May 2010:
Behera (1), Beni Suef (1), Dakahlia (4), Fayoum (1), Gharbiya (2),
Helwan(2), Luxor (3), Menoufia (4), Port Said (1), Qalioubiya (1), Sharkiya
(1), and Sixth of October (3) (The number of outbreaks in the governorate
is in brackets), and there has been no outbreak reported during June 2010.
Most of the outbreaks were in household poultry except for one commercial
farm in Luxor Governorate. One outbreak in Gharbiya was reported in
vaccinated birds.
Asia
----
Bangladesh
----------
A H5N1 HPAI outbreak in Rajshahi Division (Bogra District) was reported on
20 May 2010.
Indonesia
---------
The Participatory Disease Surveillance & Response (PDSR) programme, through
33 Local Disease Control Centres, covers 70 338 villages in 84 per cent of
Indonesia's 448 districts and municipalities in 29 of its 33 provinces.
During April 2010, PDSR conducted surveillance in 2278 villages (3.2 per
cent). The overall HPAI incidence was 1.0 newly found infected village per
1000 villages in the coverage area, but incidence varied widely between
provinces. The 4 highest provinces for incidence were Yogyakarta (9.1),
Jawa Tengah (3.4), Lampung (2.8), and Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (2.7). The
number of newly infected villages found during April 2010 by island is: 27
in Sumatra, 44 in Java, and 1 in Kalimantan.
Mongolia
--------
A total of 26 whooper swans (_Cygnus cygnus_) and greylag geese (_Anser
anser_) died at Ganga Lake, Dariganga Soum, Sukhbaatar Aimag on 3 May 2010.
On 8 May 2010, H5N1 HPAI was confirmed by the national laboratory by HA,
RT-PCR and RRT-PCR.
Viet Nam
--------Outbreaks of H5N1 HPAI [which] occurred in Dak Lak Province in May 2010 and
Quang Nam Province in June 2010 were reported on the Government website.
The last outbreak occurred on 2 Jun 2010 in ducks in Duy Thanh Commune Duy
Xuyen District of central Quang Nam Province.
Middle East
-----------Israel
------Between 29 Apr 2010 and 4 May 2010, 2 emus (_Dromaius novaehollandiae_)
died after losing appetite in a small zoological garden in Ein Gedi,
Hadarom District. Their brain samples tested positive for H5N1 HPAI by PCR.
No birds have been introduced in the mini-zoo for several months.
--
communicated by:
Juan Lubroth
Chief, Animal Health Service / CVO-FAO
Animal Production & Health Division
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
<http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/home/en/index.htm>
******
[1] FAO report
Date: Tue 15 Jun 2010
From: Akiko Kamata <Akiko.Kamata@fao.org> [edited]
FAO Animal Influenza Disease Emergency News [FAOAIDEnews], situation update 67
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H5N1 HPAI global overview April 2010: worldwide situation
---------------------------------------------------------
[From the said detailed review, we hereby present the conclusions chapter.
- Mod.AS]
Conclusions
-----------
Since 2003, 63 countries/territories have experienced outbreaks of H5N1
HPAI. The last newly infected country was Bhutan in February 2010.
Effective control measures for outbreaks in poultry have been associated
with reduced incidence of human infections in several countries. However,
H5N1 HPAI remains entrenched in poultry in parts of Asia and Africa (Egypt)
and thus the risk of human infection remains.
The number of countries reporting outbreaks was less in 2009, when compared
with 2008, 2007, and 2006. However, the number of affected countries
between January and April 2010 already equals the number of affected
countries for the whole of 2009. The total number of outbreaks reported
shows a similar, but more pronounced, trend, although surprisingly, the
total number of outbreaks between January and April 2010 already surpasses
the number of outbreaks for the whole of 2009, 356 vs. 297. Nevertheless,
the number of reported outbreaks is a more subjective indicator than the
number of affected countries, because it is highly influenced by variables
such as the case definition used, the awareness level, the
intensity/effectiveness of surveillance programmes in countries and the
willingness to report. Although there has been an improvement in disease
awareness, outbreaks/cases of H5N1 HPAI are still likely to be
underestimated and underreported in some regions because of limitations in
the capacity of veterinary services to implement sensitive and
cost-effective disease surveillance, the lack of proper outbreak
investigations in the field, and the absence or weakness of compensation
schemes.
Data from previous years have shown a peak in the number of outbreaks/cases
during the January-March 2010 period in terms of countries affected, number
of reported outbreaks and also human cases. In April 2010, it becomes
evident that we are in the decreasing trend that follows the high activity
season. While February 2010 constituted the peak so far this season in
terms of the number of outbreaks reported, the peak in terms of number of
countries affected was reached in March 2010. Overall, there is a
decreasing trend in the height of the peak as years go by. However, in
terms of number of outbreaks, and against the decreasing trend observed
since 2004, the peak height reached dimensions similar to the peaks of
2006-2007 and 2007- 2008, and considerably higher than the 2008-2009 peak.
This is explained by the higher contribution of Africa (Egypt) to the total
number of outbreaks, because of the implementation of a more intensive
surveillance programme (CAHO), together with the fact that vaccination of
backyard poultry was stopped in July 2009. It may also be related to a
reduction in the efficacy of control programmes (fatigue).
During 2010, H5N1 HPAI has reoccurred in several countries where the
disease was believed to have been eliminated (without vaccination):
Cambodia, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the cases of
Bangladesh and India, that had reported no outbreaks in the 2nd half of
2009, a new wave of cases has been observed since the beginning of 2010.
--
communicated by:
Juan Lubroth
Chief, Animal Health Service / CVO-FAO
Animal Production & Health Division
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
<http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/home/en/index.htm>
By Stacy Moniot Covering your nose and mouth whenever you cough or sneeze is a common reminder during flu season because it prevents particles from landing on surfaces and spreading through contact. "You open a doorknob, you get it on your hands and then you wipe your eyes and bam!" said Steve Davis, the director of clinical research for WVU Emergency Medicine, "you have the flu. What we've started to show through our collaboration with NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) is that may not be the case." The researchers collected air samples in the Urgent Care facility during the flu season in 2009. They found the flu virus in very small airborne particles traveling more than six or seven feet and easily inhaled. "This is an air sampler that we've got," William Lindsley, a NIOSH biomedical researcher said, pointing to a collection system standing on a tall tripod. "Here are these yellow units that pull air out of the room." Stationary collectors measured exposure to patients, and backpacks gauged the impact on doctors and nurses. "So you can imagine if we have another epidemic, flu epidemic or swine flu epidemic," Davis said, "we certainly want the health care workers in place to be able to take care of patients." Once they understand the virus, they can control the environment in clinics through factors like air flow and humidity to keep flu patients from spreading the virus to other patients and health care workers. "There are things that we might be able to do other than just wearing masks to be able to decrease infection," Davis said, "and ultimately that's the goal of this process." The next step is to find out if those particles still carry the live flu virus, meaning anyone could become infected by just inhaling the virus. Davis and Lindsley are working to develop the technology to test that possibility. |
Daniel Meers June 19th, 2010
QUEENSLAND biosecurity officials have locked down an area near the Gold Coast Turf Club fearing a potential outbreak of the fatal Hendra virus which could cripple the multimillion-dollar industry.
Government officials have banned trainers indefinitely from walking their horses in the popular forest area near the racing precinct because of a fruit bat colony which could carry and pass on the illness through bodily fluids.
The danger could last several weeks with the council and environment protection agencies forced to preserve the protected species rather than cull or remove the breeding ground for the virus.
It is believed up to 1500 fruit bats may live in trees next to the state-of-the-art Traintech education facility opposite the racecourse.
The Hendra virus has killed four people since it was first discovered in Queensland in 1994.
If an outbreak did occur, the 600-horse precinct could be locked down.
Biosecurity Queensland horse industry liaison officer Fiona Thompson last night said the agency was not prepared to risk horses contracting the virus.
"Whenever there is the potential for flying fox-horse interaction you need to put those precautions in place," she said.
"Given we have an area with such a high density of horses surrounding a flying fox colony ... it increases the risk of horses coming in contact with excretions.
"The concern is there is a walkway there and you've got an area of overhanging trees where there is the potential for faeces and urine to come in contact with horses."
It is understood the council controls the land, and has been in discussions with the Department of Primary Industries to reach a solution, but their hands are tied by environmental regulations.
"Because of the conservation nature of this site, we must look at options that are environmentally sustainable," said a council spokesperson.
"Council is working with the Department of Environment and Resources Management, Department of Primary Industries and Biosecurity to reach a solution with this particular colony of bats."
A horse at Tewantin, on the Sunshine Coast, was euthanased on May 17 after contracting the virus.
The H1N1 flu pandemic last year came out of nowhere. Well, not exactly—H1N1 first emerged in human beings in Mexico. But that wasn't where most influenza experts were looking. The focus had been on southeast Asia, where the H5N1 avian flu had been infecting—and killing—human beings for the past few years. Most flu pandemics begin in that part of the world, where dense populations of people and animals comingle. H1N1 was different, however, and the world paid the price.But we may not have learned our lesson.
A new study in the June 17 edition of Science makes the case that there has been too little followup genetic surveillance of the H1N1 virus—and that we could be vulnerable to new strains. A team of researchers from Hong Kong sequenced viruses found in pigs in the city's largest slaughterhouse over the past year and a half. They found that the H1N1 virus that had caused a human pandemic last year—and which is still infecting people—had passed back into swine, and was mutating and reassorting with other viruses the pigs had been infected by. (Pigs can be infected by multiple strains of flu viruses, making them living viral mixing bowls.) The researchers worry that H1N1's mutations could change the virulence of the virus. Although there's no evidence that has happened, there have always been concerns that H1N1 might mix with H5N1 to produce a new virus that has the transmissability of the former—H1N has reached 200 counties and is still infecting people—and the severity of the latter, which has an observed mortality rate of nearly 60%.
We can't stop flu viruses from intermingling—that's just what they do. But we can try to keep close track of new viruses through genetic surveillance—just like the kind practiced by the researchers in Hong Kong, who've been testing the city's pigs for viruses as part of a 12-year-old U.S.-funded program. While major hog producers in the U.S. and Europe frequently test their pigs for flu viruses—which helps scientists keep track of what's going on among swine—that's rare among smaller producers in Asia, even though that's exactly where pandemics often begin. The Science study underscores the need for better surveillance in the developing world:
“The message from our paper is not an inevitable disaster around the corner, but the need for continued vigilance,” Malik Peiris, a flu expert at the University of Hong Kong and one of the study's authors, said in an e-mail message.
We were lucky with the H1N1 pandemic, which turned out to be relatively mild. So mild, in fact, that some have accused the World Health Organization of overhyping the virus. A damning recent report in British Medical Journal found that World Health Organization (WHO) advisors who called for the stockpiling of H1N1 vaccine had been previously on the payroll of the drug companies that made the vaccines. (The WHO has said that there is no evidence to show that it engaged in scaremongering during the pandemic.) But that's the thing about the flu—you never know when your luck will run out.
HONG KONG (Reuters) - The H1N1 swine flu virus has been spreading quietly in pigs in Hong Kong and swapping genes with other viruses, and researchers said the findings support calls for tighter disease surveillance in pigs before new bugs can emerge and infect people.
The finding, published in Science on Friday, is important as it supports the theory that flu viruses infecting swine can swap genes with other viruses that are in pigs, including more dangerous bugs like the H5N1 or H9N2 bird flu viruses.
Malik Peiris, an influenza expert who worked on the study, said the discovery underlines the importance of disease surveillance in pigs.
"It demonstrates the pandemic virus can easily go back to pigs. Once it does so, it can reassort with other pig viruses and give rise to potentially unexpected consequences," said Peiris, a microbiology professor at the University of Hong Kong.
Peiris and colleagues, including Guan Yi at the University of Hong Kong, have found pandemic H1N1 viruses in nasal swabs taken from apparently healthy pigs at a Hong Kong abattoir during routine checks since October 2009.
"From genetic analysis, what it suggests is each of those viruses we found in pigs all came from humans," Peiris said in a telephone interview.
"It is not surprising because the pandemic virus emerged from pigs, so it is not surprising that it goes back to pigs."
PANDEMIC VIRUS SWAPS GENES IN PIGS
A sample isolated from Hong Kong pigs in January 2010 carried genes from three viruses - the pandemic H1N1, a European "avian like" H1N1 and a so-called "triple reassortant" virus containing bits of human, pig and bird flu viruses which was first discovered in North America in 1998.
"This suggests that the pig is a place where the pandemic virus might actually change and reassort and get new properties possibly," Peiris said.
"The pandemic virus in humans has been extremely stable. It hasn't changed at all even though people were concerned it might reassort and mix with human viruses ... but it seems that it can mix with other flu viruses (in a pig)."
Genetic research has suggested that H1N1, first identified in people in April 2009, had in fact been circulating for at least a decade and probably in pigs. Despite tight controls on herd to protect them from people, little checking is done globally to see whether food herds are infected and if so, with what viruses.
Studies in the past year have turned up pigs in Canada and other countries infected with the pandemic H1N1 virus, evidently carried to the animals by people.
"I must emphasize the point that it doesn't mean that pork is dangerous to eat at all (if well cooked). What it means is it is important to carry out systematic surveillance in pigs so we know what is going on in pigs in regard to influenza viruses in general and the pandemic virus in particular," Peiris said.
Pigs are the reservoir of many human, bird and swine viruses and experts often refer to them as an ideal mixing vessel for new, and possibly more dangerous pathogens.
Asked if there was a possibility of the H1N1 getting mixed up with the H5N1, Peiris said: "That is certainly a possibility, that's why we need to keep track.
"If it is quite able to readily reassort and pick up genes from pig viruses, you might have other combinations of genes that can arise. Unless we are alert to it, we potentially could have a virus that is ... more virulent coming back to humans."
Although H5N1 is a mostly avian virus, it causes more severe illness in people than seasonal flu and kills 60 percent of the people it infects. It has infected 499 people and killed 295 of them since re-emerging in 2003.
The World Health Organization said early in June that the H1N1 pandemic was not yet over although its most intense activity has passed in many parts of the world.